EXPLAINING AND TACKLING UNDER-DECLARED EMPLOYMENT IN FYR MACEDONIA: THE EMPLOYERS PERPSPECTIVE The employers perspective

Main Article Content

Colin C. Williams Slavko Bezeredi

Abstract

To explain and tackle employers who illegally under-report their employees’ salaries to evade paying the full tax and social contributions owed, these employers have been conventionally explained as rational economic actors doing so when the benefits outweigh the costs, and thus the solution is to increase the sanctions and/or probability of detection. An alternative social actor approach, however, explains employers as under-reporting salaries because of their lack of both vertical trust (i.e., their beliefs are not in symmetry with the laws and regulations) and horizontal trust (i.e., they believe many others are non-compliant). Reporting a 2015 survey of 450 employers in FYR Macedonia, the finding is that there is no strong association between employers under-reporting salaries and their perceived level of penalties and risks of detection, but a strong significant association with both their level of vertical and horizontal trust. The theoretical and policy implications are then discussed.  

Article Details

How to Cite
Williams, C., & Bezeredi, S. (2018). EXPLAINING AND TACKLING UNDER-DECLARED EMPLOYMENT IN FYR MACEDONIA: THE EMPLOYERS PERPSPECTIVE. The South East European Journal of Economics and Business, 13(2), 19-31. Retrieved from https://journal.efsa.unsa.ba/index.php/see/article/view/842
Section
Scientific and Professional papers: Economics and Business
Author Biographies

Colin C. Williams, University of Sheffield

Colin C. Williams is Professor of Public Policy at the University of Sheffield, United Kingdom

Slavko Bezeredi, Institute of Public Finance

Slavko Bezeredi is a Researcher in the Institute of Public Finance, Zagreb, Croatia